Abstract-Certificateless public key cryptography was introduced to avoid the inherent key escrow problem in identity-based cryptography, and eliminate the use of certificates in traditional PKI. Most cryptographic schemes in certificateless cryptography are built from bilinear mappings on elliptic curves which need costly operations. Despite the investigation of certificateless public key encryption without pairings, certificateless signature without pairings received much less attention than what it deserves. In this paper, we present a concrete pairing-free certificateless signature scheme for the first time. Our scheme is more computationally efficient than others built from pairings. The new scheme is provably secure in the random oracle model assuming the hardness of discrete logarithm problem.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Asiacrypt 2003, Al-Riyami and Paterson proposed the notion of "Certificateless Public Key Cryptography" [1] , whose original motivation is to find a public key system that does not use certificates, and at the same time does not have the key escrow problem. In certificateless cryptography, each user has two secrets, namely a secret value and a partial private key. The former is generated by the entity itself, and the latter is produced by a third party called as the Key Generating Center (KGC), who holds a master key. Decrypting or signing requires both secrets. As KGC does not know the secret value generated by the user, the key escrow problem is eliminated. The corresponding public key is generated by using the secret value and (optional) the partial private key. In certificateless cryptography, one's public key could be made available to other users by transmitting it along with messages (for example, in a signing application) or by placing it in a public directory (this would be more appropriate for an encryption setting).
Since the introduction of certificateless cryptography, a lot of schemes have been proposed so far(e.g., [4] , [5] , [6] , [8] , [9] , [11] ). However, as pointed out by Baek et al. [2] , certificateless encryption schemes (and certificateless signature schemes) have been constructed within the framework of ID-based encryption proposed by Boneh and Franklin [3] . As a result, most certificateless cryptography schemes are based on bilinear mappings on elliptic curves, which are used to construct identity-based encryption and require heavy computational cost. Being aware of this, Baek et al. [2] proposed the first certificateless encryption scheme which does not depend on bilinear mappings. Sun et al. [12] improved their scheme and proposed a strongly secure certificateless encryption without pairings. Both schemes [2] , [12] are more computationally efficient than others from bilinear mappings.
To the best of our knowledge, all concrete constructions of certificateless signatures in the literature are built from bilinear mappings. In this paper, we present the first concrete efficient certificateless signature scheme without pairings, and prove its security in the random oracle model. The security of our scheme can be reduced to discrete logarithm problem in finite fields. Our work is motivated by certificateless encryption schemes proposed in [2] , [12] . Namely, by incorporating Schnorr signature [10] nontrivially, we obtain a certificateless signature scheme without pairings.
II. PRELIMINARIES
This section reviews definitions of certificateless signatures and complexity assumptions associated with our scheme.
A. Syntax of Certificateless Signature Scheme
Definition 1: A certificateless signature scheme is made up of seven algorithms: Setup, Partial-Key-Extract, Set-SecretValue, Set-Public-Key, Set-Private-Key, Sign, Verify. For a fixed security parameter k, these algorithms work as follows:
This algorithm takes a security parameter k as input and returns the master secret key msk, the master public key mpk and a list of public system parameters params. This algorithm takes system parameters params, the master public key mpk, the user's identity ID, a public key P K ID , and a message/signature pair (m, σ) as inputs, and returns "valid" or "invalid". Completeness. For any correctly generated key pair
B. Security Model of Certificateless Signatures
As there is no certificate to authenticate a user's public key, it is reasonable to assume that an adversary can replace the user's public key with any value of its choice. Thus, two types of adversaries have been defined in certificateless cryptography [1] . A Type I adversary can replace any user's public key but does not have the partial private key of the target user, while a Type II adversary simulates a dishonest KGC who has the knowledge of the master secret key (and thus the partial private keys of all users), but is not allowed to replace the target user's public key.
For the security model of our certificateless signature scheme, we consider the strongest Type I adversaries defined in [5] : Super Type I adversary A I , which is given as much power as possible. A I can obtain some message/signature pairs which are valid under the public key chosen by itself without providing the corresponding secret value.
For Type II adversary, we also consider the strongest adversary model "Super Type II adversary" defined in [5] , which is given as much power as possible. A II is allowed to obtain some message/signature pairs which are valid under the public key chosen by itself without providing the corresponding secret value. Note that A II is not allowed to replace the target user's public key. [5] for the formal game-based models of above definitions.
Definition 4: A certificateless signature scheme is existentially unforgeable against chosen message and chosen identity attacks if it satisfies Def. 2 and Def. 3.
C. Complexity Assumption
The security of our certificateless signature scheme can be reduced to the hardness of discrete logarithm problem. Let p, q be two primes and q|(p − 1). Let G be a subgroup of Z * p with prime order q and generator g. The discrete logarithm problem is defined as follows.
Definition 5:
III. THE PROPOSED SCHEME In this section, we describe our certificateless signature scheme without pairings. It consists of the following algorithms:
• Setup: This algorithm runs as follows: 1) Given a security parameter k ∈ N, this algorithm first chooses two primes p, q, where p, q > 2 k and q|(p − 1). It then chooses an element g ∈ Z * p with order q. The subgroup generated by g is denoted as G;
2) The master secret key x is randomly chosen from Z * q , and the master public key is calculated as y = g x (mod p); 3) Chooses three distinct cryptographic hash functions (ID,p0,p1) (mod p). If both equations hold, the user continues to run the following algorithms.
• Set-Secret-Value: This algorithm picks z ∈ Z * q at random, and sets s ID = z as the user's secret value.
• Set-Private-Key: Given the user's partial private key D ID and the secret value s ID , the full private key = H 3 (m, ID, c, c , P K ID ) ; 3) Calculates v = r − uz (mod q) and w = r − ud 0 (mod q). The signature on the message m is σ = (u, v, w).
• Verify: Given params, the signer's identity ID, P K ID = (p 0 , p 1 , d 1 , μ) , a message m and the signature σ = (u, v, w), the verifier checks if
If both equations are correct, this algorithm outputs "valid". Otherwise, it outputs "invalid".
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we will show that the proposed scheme is secure against Super Type I adversary and Super Type II adversary defined in Section II-B. This is ensured by the following two theorems.
Theorem 1: Our certificateless signature scheme is secure against Super Type I adversary in the random oracle model, assuming that the discrete logarithm problem is intractable on Z p .
Theorem 2: Our certificateless signature scheme is secure against Super Type II adversary in the random oracle model, assuming that the discrete logarithm problem is intractable on Z p . The proofs of above theorems follow the same idea. We shall prove that if there is a Super Type I or Type II adaptively chosen message and chosen identity adversary which can break our certificateless signature scheme with non-negligible probability, then there exists another algorithm B which can solve the discrete logarithm problem with non-negligible success probability as well. Below we give the details of the proof of Theorem 1. Due to page limitation, we omit the proof of Theorem 2, which employs the similar technique to the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let A I be a Super Type I adversary against our certificateless signature scheme. We want to build an algorithm B that uses A I as a black-box to solve the discrete logarithm problem. At the beginning, B is given two primes p, q and a discrete logarithm problem instance (g, β = g α ). The goal of algorithm B is to find α such that β = g α (mod p). We show that by acting as A I 's challenger, B can use A I to find α.
B initializes A I with the master public key y = g x , where x is the master secret key and B keeps it secret. B then gives system parameters params = (p, q, g, 
In this case, the corresponding partial public key of 
In this case, the corresponding partial public key of ID *
, and the secret value s ID * = z t . In either cases, B adds • Secret-Value-Extraction: For the secret value extraction query on a created user ID i , B finds s IDi on list L and returns it to A I as the answer.
• Public-Key-Replacement Request: When A I makes a public key replacement query on
If the above equals, B returns "failure" and aborts the simulation. Otherwise, B replaces the original public key P K IDi with (P K ) IDi . Then B will update the list L and rewrites the corresponding information as 
. If the collision happens, B will rechoose (u, v, w) until there is no collision happens on L H3 . In either case, B outputs σ = (u, v, w) as ID i 's signature on m. As the random oracle H 3 is controlled by B, each signature σ = (u, v, w) will pass the verification. The above simulated signature is identically distributed as the one in the real attack. By doing this, B performs a perfect simulation. Eventually, A I outputs a valid signature (ID, m, σ = (u, v, w)).
• If ID = ID * or σ is not a valid signature, B returns "failure".
• Otherwise, B can solve the discrete logarithm problem by applying the forking technique. According to the forking lemma [7] , if A I is a sufficient efficient forger in the above interactions, B can obtain two valid signatures σ = (u, v, w) and σ = (u , v , w ) (u = u ) that satisfies
Probability of Success: It remains to compute the probability that B solves the given instance of the discrete logarithm problem. B succeeds if: 1) Λ 1 : B does not abort during the simulation; 2) Λ 2 : (ID, m, σ = (u, v, w)) can pass the verification under the current public key P K ID ; 3) Λ 3 : In the forgery (ID, m, σ = (u, v, w) 
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present the first concrete certificateless signature scheme without pairings. Our construction is motivated by certificateless encryption schemes without pairings proposed in [2] , [12] . The new scheme is provably secure (in the random oracle model) against Super Type I and Super Type II adversaries defined in [5] , assuming that the discrete logarithm problem is intractable. The proposed scheme is more computationally efficient than other certificateless signature schemes from bilinear mappings.
